Mercer Law Review
Volume 2
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 8

12-1950

Criminal Law and Procedure
H.T. O'Neal Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
O'Neal, H.T. Jr. (1950) "Criminal Law and Procedure," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 2: No. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol2/iss1/8

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CRIMINAL LAW
By H. T. O'NEAL, JR.*
The course of the Criminal Law is so firmly established that a year of
decisions fails to generate any momentous impact. Its ancient principles
have "existed from the time whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary."' The twelve months of -decisions herein surveyed have produced neither radical departure nor astounding change.
In order to construct a coherent story of one year of Criminal Law, it is
necessary to devise several very general categories into which each of the
decisions can find a place. Certain of these divisions, particularly those
concerning evidence and procedure, have received exhaustive treatment
elsewhere in this survey. Even so, there appears to be no alternative but to
deal with these subjects solely from the standpoint of criminal law-for but
little would be left of such a broad subject if it were segregated from evidence and procedure.
EVIDENCE

It is the rule in this state that all evidence offered is presumed admissible
unless the party displeased at its admittance can make some valid objection.2
Where evidence is objected to in its entirety, it will be admitted if any portion of it is not subject to the objection made.' And where evidence is objectionable, it may be admitted if the defendant sets forth in his statement
the fact which such objectionable evidence seeks to prove. 4
In Georgia, no problem of admissibility arises from the manner in which
criminal evidence is obtained. Evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure is freely admissible in the state courts.' Under the prevailing rule in
the fedearl courts, however, such evidence cannot be admitted.' Nor is evidence obtained by wire-tapping or by a confession procured during an illegal detention8 admissible in federal court.
The principal exception to the previously stated rule that all evidence is
presumed admissible is the law pertaining to confessions. The rule is that
a confession may not be admitted into evidence until a showing is made that
it was freely and voluntarily given, without the slightest hope of benefit or
the remotest fear of injury? A confession, without corroboration, cannot
sustain a conviction, but simple proof of the corpus delecti is held to be a
sufficient corroboration of the confession." The corpus delecti may be
*Member Macon Bar; LL.B., 1950, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer Uni1,ersity; Member Georgia Bar Association.
1. Frances v. Wood, 75 Ga. 648, 652 (1885).
2. Rogers v. State. 89 Ga. Apn. 585. 56 S.E.2d 633 (1949).

3. Ricks v. State, 206 Ga. 20, 55 S.E.2d 576 (1949).
4. Ibid.
5. Polite v. State, 80 Ga. App. 835, 57 S.E.2d 631 (1950).
6. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 48 ,.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).
7. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
8. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410. 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 129 (1948).
9. Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950).
10. Mills v. State, 81 Ga. App. 463, 59 S.E.2d 44 (1950) ; Figures v. State, 80 Ga. App.
832, 57 S.E.2d 629 (1950).
(42)
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proved by circumstantial evidence; the Court of Appeals, in an arson case,"
held that the corpus delecti was sufficiently proved by a showing that a
burned building was isolated (and thus not likely to catch fire by accident), that there was a lack of natural cause to originate a fire, and that
the fire must have been incendiary because of the extreme difficulty in fighting the flames. Judge Townsend dissented, stating that for proof of a
corpus delecti to be strong enough to corroborate a confession, every element of the corpus delecti must be proved by some kind of evidence extraneous to the confession. Before terminating the subject of confessions, it may
be well-to reiterate that it is not incumbent upon a trial court to charge the
law of confessions and admissions (i.e., that "admissions should be scanned
with care, and confessions received with great
caution," etc.) in the ab12
sence of a timely written request to so charge.
Expounding the well-settled principle that a non-expert witness may testify as to his opinion of the sanity of a defendant, Brock v. State," a murder
case, further holds that the factual background which has been laid for the
rendering of such an opinion should offer some basis for judging the defendant's mental condition.
Once an expert witness has testified as to his knowledge of a given subject, he may, of course, be examined as to some particular transaction or
occurence within his field." The case of Wyatt v. State" appears to carry
this principle far. It holds that where a psychiatrist testifies as to a defendant's insanity, such psychiatrist can be examined as to any or all of the
defendant's past life, including a previous murder. The court reasoned that
facts which give rise to a psychiatrist's opinion can not be withheld, regardless of their nature.
Photographs, when properly authenticated, are readily admitted into
evidence, no matter how morbid or gruesome they may be. A sickening picture of wounds of the deceased was admitted in Bryan v. State'" to show
the location of the wounds. And again, in Anderson v. State," pictures of
the emaciated body of a dead child, whom the defendant was accused of
negligently starving to death, were admitted.
Circumstantial evidence will not sustain a conviction unless it excludes
every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the defendant."

However, Grimes v. State'9 holds, inter alia, that this rule cannot be con-

strued to mean all other inferences but that of the guilt of defendant. Although it is permissible to show the motives of the defendant in any criminal case, this is especially true in cases based on circumstantial evidence.
In cases arising from the driving of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants, direct evidence that the defendant was drinking
before and after an accident amounts only to circumstantial evidence of
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. Aiop. 489, 54 S.E.2d 3C2 (1949).
Elvine v. State, 205 Ga. 528, 54 S.E.2d 626 (1949).
206 Ga. 397, 57 S.E.2d 279 (19501.
Carlin v. State, 81 Ga. App. 353, 58 S.E.2d 485 (1950).
2'C6 Ga. 613, 57 S.E.2d 914 (1950).
206 Ga. 73, 55 S.E.2d 574 (1949).
206 Ga. 527, 57 S.E.2d 563 (1950).
Weehunt v. State, 80 Ga. App. 368, 56 S.E.2d 148 (1949).
79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E.2d 302 (1949).
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intoxication at the time of the accident."0 Where evidence is purely circumstantial, it is error for the court to fail to charge thereon, even in the absence of a request to so charge.2
Several cases have approved the admission of evidence which seems
somewhat questionable. In Uley v. State22 the defendant was convicted of
shooting into an occupied dwelling, and every firearm which he ownedalthough only one was used in the crime-was admitted in evidence. Phillips
v. State ' appears to be a bona fide oddity. The defendant in this case was
charged with murder in Laurens County, Georgia, but there was placed in
evidence against him a robbery which he committed in Miami, Florida,
many days after the killing. The court held that such evidence was admissible to show the motives of the officers who arrested him. However, McClung v. Statae,"' a companion case, may shed some light on the Phillips decision. It holds that all the details of flight, evasion and arrest are admissible to show motive and intent at the time of the crime, and if robbery is included in flight, it is admissible. The court, in Waller v. State, 5 held that
a photostat of a police radio log, which consisted of communications between officers attempting to apprehend the defendant, was admissible as
a part of the res gestae. When an attack has been made upon the conduct
of an arresting officer, such officer may show by almost any evidence why
he so conducted himself regarding the defendant, even though it involves
an attack upon the defendant's character.
In AlicCullough v. State27 it was held that in a prosecution for possession
of illicity whisky,. it is proper to show that the defendant's vehicle has
previously been taken by the state in a condemnation proceeding based on
the fact that it had been used as a medium for hauling non-tax paid whisky.
Numerous other cases have been decided on points of criminal evidence
during the period covered by this survey, but they involve principles too
well-settled to merit discussion. 8
PROCEDURE

It is universally held that, in criminal cases, counsel have vast latitude
in arguments to the jury. There are, however, several cases which plainly
show that such a privilege has very definite limitations, beyond which counsel cannot venture. In Wlashington v. State29 the solicitor general argued to
the jury that, if he had not made out a case, the court would have directed
a verdict for the defendant. It was held that this was grossly improper as
20. Waters v. State, 80 Ga. App. 559, 56 S.E.2d 924 (1949); Culver v. State, 80 Ga.
App. 438, 56 S.E.2d 197 (1949).
Culver v. State, supra note 20.
79 Ga. App. 592, 54 S.E.2d 339 (1949).
206 Ga. 418, 57 S.E.2d 555 (1950).
206 Ga. 421, 57 S.E.2d 559 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 488, 56 S.E.2d 49 (1949).
Hardison v. State, 81 Ga. App. 345, 58 S.E.2d 480 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 166, 58 S.E.2d 467 (1950).
Wiggins v. State, 80 Ga. App. 258, 55 S.E.2d 842 (1949) ; Harris v. State, 81 Ga.
App. 81, 57 S.E.2d 842 (1950) ; Owens v. State, 81 Ga. App. 182, 58 S.E.2d 550
(1950) ; Cato v. State, 81 Ga. App. 496, 59 S.E.2d 279 (1950) ; Soldaat v. State, 81
Ga. App. 71, 57 S.E.2d 705 (1950) ; Haynes v. State, 80 Ga. App. 99, 55 S.E.2d 646
(1949).
29. 80 Ga. App. 415, 56 S.E.2d 119 (1949).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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being an expression of the court's opinion. The case further stands for the
principle that a mere objection to argument is sufficient and no specific
ground need be pointed out. A conviction was reversed in Johns v. State"9
because the solicitor argued that the defendant had brought in some character witnesses but knew better than to use them.
Since it is permissible for counsel to argue inferences from the evidence,
it was not error for the solicitor to shout that the defendant was an "outlaw," in view of the fact that the evidence amply warranted such a conclusion. " Generally, a reversal on grounds of improper argument cannot be
had if the court feels that the verdict was demanded by the evidence. 2
Construing the Code Section33 providing for a change of venue in criminal cases, the Court of Appeals, in Garrett v. State,34 held that the trial
judge has great discretion in deciding a motion for a change of venue based
on an allegation that an impartial jury cannot be secured. But in Barranton
v. State3" the court, in reviewing the overruling of a motion for a change
of venue based on an alleged danger of mob violence, held that since the
evidence showed a reasonable probability of lynching, the change ought to
have been granted. This rule was further elucidated in Pinkston v. State,"
in which the court held that where there is a reasonable doubt as to the
safety of the defendant in the event of an acquittal, it is mandatory that
the change of venue be granted.
In the situation in which several persons contribute to a fund to employ
an attorney to aid in prosecuting a defendant, such contributors are "voluntary prosecutors," and a juror within the prohibited degree of relationship
to a voluntary prosecutor is disqualified. 7 If a juror was subject to disqualification as being within the prohibited 6th degree, and a defendant attempts to acquire a new trial for such reason, he must show that, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, he could not have discovered the defect before
verdict."
A juror will not be heard to impeach his own verdict in a criminal case. 9
The right to have a jury visit the scene of an alleged crime is entirely within the discretion of the trial court.40
Ordinary motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored, and extraordinary motions on this ground are even
less favored. Evidence which is solely cumulative or solely impeaching cannot be made the basis for a new trial." An extraordinary motion may not
be used to review an adverse ruling previously made on an ordinary motion.4 " Where a defendant makes a motion for a new trial, and through no
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

79 Ga. App. 429, 54 S.E.2d 142 (1949).
Dryden v. State, 81 Ga. App. 171, 58 S.E.2d 519 (1950).
Heard v. State, 79 Ga. App. 601, 54 S.E.2d 495 (1949).
GA. CODE § 27-1201 (1933).
80 Ga. App. 118, 55 S.E.2d 672 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 44, 55 S.E.2d 253 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 268, 55 S.E.2d 877 (1949).
Latum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949).
Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 107, 55 S.E.2d 589 (1949).
Williams v. State, 206 Ga. 757, 58 S.E.2d 840 (1950).
Gibson v. State, 81 Ga. App. 27, 57 S.E.2d 706 (1950).
Williams v. State, 80 Ga. App. 638, 56 S.E.2d 922 (1949); Wallace v. State, 205 Ga.
751, 55 S.E.2d.145 (1949).
42. Loomis v. Edwards, 80 Ga. App. 396, 56 S.E.2d 183 (1949).
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fault of the defendant, the judge fails to hear the motion, it should not be
dismissed, but should automatically go over to the next term."8 In motions
for a new trial on the grounds that the conviction was obtained by purjured
testimony of a state's witness, it is essential that the purjured witness be
convicted for perjury before such motion can succeed."
The writ of habeas corpus is not one for the correction of errors-it is
applicable only when the court was without jurisdiction, or exceeded its
jurisdiction. 5 In McClendon v. State" the defendant made a motion in arrest of judgment on the grounds that he had never been arraigned. The
court held that this motion could only correct such defects as appeared
on the face of the record, and such as could have been successfully attacked
by general demurrer. Snipes v. Houlihan47 held that in the situation where
a petition for certiorari was not sanctioned by the trial court, it could not
be considered, for, notwithstanding the statute providing that no bill of
exceptions will be dismissed on account of a defect curable within the term,
the trial judge was without authority to sanction, since the 2o days given by
law had already elapsed.
A suspended sentence exists when a judge releases a prisoner until further order of court, but a probation sentence is had when the prisoner is
allowed his freedom on certain specified conditions which he must follow."
No hearing need be granted the defendant for the revocation of a suspended sentence. However, in the case of a probation sentence the defendant
must be granted a hearing."0 When a judge desires to revoke the sentence,
he may have the defendant brought in, with or without warrant, for the
hearing; and, upon the hearing, the judge may revoke the probation sentence without fear of reversal, if there is any evidence upon which to base
his decision."
An interesting point was raised in Boyett v. State,52 a larceny case. The
defendant entered a guilty plea, but attempted to withdraw it after sentence
was imposed. Although the Court of Appeals ruled against the defendant,
it appeared to be in sympathy with his unhappy position, for it held that although leave to withdraw a plea is in the discretion of the trial judge, it
should be granted if the defendant is under a misapprehension as to the
legal effect of his plea, or if he has acted in reliance on a promise by the
prosecution or the court.
In the decision of Perks v. State" the question of a judge's authority to
commute a sentence was §ettled. Under the Code34 it is provided that in
cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, a judge may in his discretion
commute a sentence from death to life imprisonment. The Perks case holds
Sheppard v. State, 79 Ga. App. 694, 54 S.E.2d 503 (1949).
Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949).
Wallace v. Foster, 206 Ga. 561, 57 S.E.2d 920 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 218, 58 S.E.2d 462 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 492, 59 S.E.2d 253 (1950).
Mincey v. Crow, 198 Ga. 245, 31 S.E.2d 406 (1944).
Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167, 56 S.E.2d 482 (1949).
Alewine v. State, 79 Ga. App. 779, 54 S.E.2d 501 (1949).
Ibid; Waters v. State, 80 Ga. App. 104, 55 S.E.2d 677 (1949) ; Brooks v. State, 81
Ga. App. 177, 58 S.E.2d 518 (1950).
52. 81 Ga. App. 49, 57 S.E.2d 831 (1950).
53. 206 Ga. 675, 58 S.E.2d 142 (1950).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

54.

GA. CODE § 26-1005 (1933).
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that the general power of commutation lies in the State Board of Pardons
and Paroles, and not in the trial judges, and that where a judge has exercised his discretion either by acting or failing to act at the time he passes
sentence, he no longer has any authority to commute a sentence.
During the year under survey, a multitude of interesting "whisky cases"
were decided. Only three of these will be discussed from their procedural
5 the hapless defendant was awaiting trial in
aspects. In Nobles v. State"
the city court when he was indicted in superior court for the same offense.
This procedure was held to be proper, since the city court-a non-constitutional court-is merely an aid to the superior court. The defendant could
not suffer, because a judgment in either court is a bar to a prosecution in
the other. Liberal Finance Co. v. State " involved a condemnation proceeding against a vehicle containing illicit whisky. The company intervened,
claiming title, but disclaiming any knowledge whatsoever of the crime. The
court held that, in such a case, the burden is on the intervenor to show that
he had no knowledge of the criminal transaction. When this burden is successfully carried, the full extent of the intervenor's claim is protected.
Morris v. State 7 dealt with an indictment in three counts. Count 2 alleged
that whisky was left in an outhouse in Fulton County; count 3 alleged that
whisky, on another occasion, was stored in the same outhouse. The defendant contended that no venue was shown in count 3, and that it was,
therefore, a nullity. These contentions were short-lived, for the Court of
Appeals could find no real merit therein.
CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

The case of Carriganv. State8 was a murder case in which the defendant
claimed accident and misfortune. He maintained that he and the deceased
had been playing with a pistol, that he thought he had removed all of the
cartridges from it, but that he had, in fact, been mistaken about this, for
that he had fatally shot the deceased when he pulled the trigger. In affirming his conviction, the Supreme Court stated that manslaughter is committed when a pistol is aimed at another and accidentally discharged, but
that murder is committed when a pistol is so aimed, in reliance on the belief
9 is
that it is unloaded, and is thus recklessly discharged. Beigun v. State"
another case in which "misfortune" blossomed into murder, this time
through the medium of an abortion. The conviction was affirmed, the court
stating that a homicide is murder if it results from an act which the jury
finds to naturally tend toward destruction of human life.
0 was convicted of murder because of
The defendant in Pierce v. State"
a homicide caused by him while driving an automobile during a time that
he was under the influence of intoxicants. The conviction was affirmed on
the same principle that governed the Carrigan and Beigun cases. Justices
Atkinson, Wyatt and Head dissented. It is interesting to note that this case,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

81 Ga. App.
80 Ga. App.
81 Ga. App.
206 Ga. 707,
206 Ga. 618,
206 Ga. 500,

220, 58 S.E.2d 496 (1950).
697, 57 S.E.2d 220 (1950).
69, 57 S.E.2d 841 (1950).
58 S.E.2d 407 (1950).
58 S.E.2d 149 (1950).
57 S.E.2d 607 (1950).
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in at least one respect, is similar to practically every case dealt with regarding homicides resulting from automobile accidents-it has produced
a divided court.
Robinson v. State,' a matter of assault with intent to rape, dealt with
-the question of repugnancy of a verdict. The defendant, tried on two separate indictments, was found not guilty of a burglarious breaking and entering with intent to rape, but was found guilty of assault with intent to
rape. The Court of Appeals produced a simple solution to the matter: the
verdict was not repugnant, for the jury found that the defendant attained
a lawful entry into the house-perhaps was invited-but after his lawful
entry, he abandoned his status of a visitor and assaulted the person of the
female involved. In another rape case, Bonner v. State, 2 the court held that
under the facts of the case, assault and battery was not included in the
greater crime of rape-this situation being brought about by the fact that,
while the State contended that rape was committed, the defendant chose to
defend on the ground that since he had paid the prosecutrix ten dollars
for the liberties which he took, no rape was possible. Thus, the court ruled
that the issue was one of rape or no rape, and that no smaller crime could
possibly be involved. This same general principle was applied in a murder
prosecution where evidence for the State showed premeditated murder and
evidence for the defendant showed justifiable homicide. A charge on voluntary manslaughter Was held to be error, since there was no way in which it
could possibly be involved.63 Walker v. State64 was a case in which a female
sought to defend herself against an alleged rape by perforating the deceased with pistol bullets. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. The court upheld the verdict, stating that the jury was free
to reject the defendant's contention that she was in mortal fear of rape
when she committed the act, and that it could find that she shot to prevent
an act (petting) which was less than a felony. Under such a finding she
would not be justified in killing the deceased, but would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Wright v. State65 was appealed upon a most unusual point. The defendant in the case was a woman accused of murder. In charging the law of
reasonable fears, the learned trial judge used throughout his charge the
term "reasonable man." It was contended that the circumstances which
give rise to the reasonable fear which must be possessed by a man before
his commission of a homicide is justifiable is vastly different from the things
which give a woman such a reasonable fear. The court was unwilling to
ascribe to a jury such a lack of intelligence as to hold that it would be confused by the use of the generic term "reasonable man," and forthwith affirmed the judgment.
In deciding the case of Jarrardv. State" the court reiterated the principle
that threats, menaces and contemptous gestures cannot justify a homicide,
but was of the opinion that these acts might, under the doctrine of reason61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

79 Ga. App. 644, 54 S.E.2d 661 (1949).
206 Ga. 19, 55 S.E.2d 587 (1949).
Brawner v. State, 81 Ga. App. 163, 58 S.E.2d 239 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 418, 56 S.E.2d 132 (1949).
206 Ga. 644, 58 S.E.2d 181 (1950).
206 Ga. 112, 55 S.E.2d 706 (1949).
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able fears, produce in a reasonable mind the fear that a felony is about to
be perpetrated, though no actual assault has occurred.
It is, of course, elementary that in cases of assault with intent to murder,
a specific intention to kill must be shown. This intention, however, may be
inferred from all the circumstances of the commission of the crime; it may
be shown by the nature of the weapon, the manner of its use, the nature
of the wound inflicted and the length of time the victim was incapacitated
as a result of the injury.
On a charge given in an assault and battery case, Mitchell v. State,"
the Court of Appeals was equally divided. The trial court charged the jury
that the defendant had contended that he had never laid hand on the
prosecutor, that if they believed this, they should acquit, and if not, they
should convict. The Supreme Court upheld the charge. In Lundy v. State69
the court went into a charge regarding justification of the offense, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had relied on an alibi as his defense.
The court held that the giving of this charge was not erroneous although
it made the defendant appear to be in a position where he had to justify a
crime he claimed he did not even see. A number of other cases"0 have upheld charges similar to the two which have been discussed.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, MORALITY, DECENCY AND SAFETY

The Court of Appeals rendered a very interesting decision in the case of
Gore v. State,7 ' wherein it was held that an indictment for showing indecent
moving pictures stated an offense under the obscenity statute of 1879," as
amended in 1935." The contention of the defendant was that the statute
of 1879 did not refer to motion pictures and could not have contemplated
them, since motion pictures were generally unknown at that time, and that,
further, the Act of 1935 merely re-enacted the former statute without
change, except for an increase in the penalty; therefore nothing was added
to the substance of the old act by the 1935 amendment. The court held,
however, that while the re-enactment of 1935 was in substantially the same
language as the older act, it was made in full contemplation of existing
conditions, and was therefore constituted a contemporary statute broad
enough to cover projected pictures as well as those drawn, printed or otherwise constructed as in earlier times. W'orley v. State 4 is another case dealing with the alteration or amendment of an old statute. The defendant
therein was prosecuted for following his ordinary calling on Sunday, which
calling consisted of auto racing. The State contended that this violated
the statute 5 prohibiting work on Sunday. Defendant took the position that
67. Shanks v. State, 80 Ga. App. 759, 57 S.E.2d 357 (1950); Breland v. State, 80 Ga.
App. 575, 56 S.E.2d 921 (1949).
68. 205 Ga. 532, 54 S.E.2d 395 (1949).
69. 81 Ga. App. 215, 58 S.E.2d 200 (1950).

70. Patterson v. State, 206 Ga. 260, 56 S.E.2d 501 (1949) ; Hackney v. State, 206 Ga.
64, 55 S.E.2d 704 (1949) ; McBurnett v. State, 206 Ga. 59, 55 S.E.2d 599 (1949).

71. 79 Ga. App. 696, 54 S.E.2d 669 (1949).
72. Ga. Laws 1878-1879, p. 163.

73. Ga. Laws 1935, p. 158.
74. 79 Ga. App. 594, 54 S.E.2d 439 (1949).

75. GA. CODE § 26-6905 (1933).
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Act 239"6 allows athletic games and contests on Sunday, and that his calling is such a contest. Speaking for the Court of Appeals, Judge Gardner
ruled that the act and the statute must be construed in pari materia, that
hence the act simply restricts the operation of the statute against games and
contests, and that the defendant had committed no wrong. When, however,
a statute declares certain acts to be crimes, and then excepts certain classes
of people or activities from its operation, the burden is always on the defendant to prove that he comes within the exception."
In Steed v. State, 8 a bastardy proceeding, it is shown with manifest clarity how reluctant courts are to burden a child with illegitimacy for the
dubious gain of conviction of the alleged father. In reversing a conviction
because of the erroneous exclusion of certain evidence offered by the defendant, the court stated that it preferred to presume that the child was
the legitimate offspring of a prior common law marriage between the prosecutrix and a third party than to declare an innocent child a bastard. Regarding the prosecurtix, the court, waxing eloquent, said: "She, in parlance
of football, made a wide swing to the left and found a hole in the line
through which she thought she could carry the ball for a touchdown ofcconviction of the defendant. We think, according to the law and the evidence,
that she fumbled."
For a thorough and exhaustive history and analysis of "the crime unmentionable," the case of Barton v. State79 can hardly be surpassed. Declaring sodomy to be the low-water mark to which humanity can possibly
descend, the court set out the principle that the commission of this crime is
not restricted to one medium, but includes acts committed per anum, per
os or by any other unnatural carnal copulation.
Kinney v. State" dealt with the matter of an ill-governed house. While
the defendant's husband was away (confined in a state work camp), she
kept the home fires burning in a manner which disturbed the neighborhood,
the conduct of the defendant and her friends including drinking, fighting
and cursing. Defendant took the position that since she was not the head of
the house, she could not be guilty of the crime of running an ill-governed
house. The court, in failing to concur in such contention, held that when a
husband is not present in the home and a wife operates it in a manner forbidden by law, she is guilty of running an ill-governed house.
In Huff v. State8 the defendant was convicted of participation in a lottery, contrary to the statute" forbidding the same. The court held that a
participant in, as well as an operator of, a lottery is guilty of misdemeanor.
A clear-cut decision83 has been handed down on the subject of cruelty to
animals. To sustain a conviction of this offense, the rule is that there must
have been an intentional infliction of injury with malice or evil design.
Malice may be implied if the injury was perpetrated with a "mind dis76. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1008.
77. Colbert v. State, 80 Ga. App. 641, 56 S.E.2d 830 (1949).

78. 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949).
79. 79 Ga. App. 380, 53 S.E.2d 707 (1949).
80. 80 Ga. App. 754, 57 S.E.2d 359 (1950).
81. 81 Ga. App. 461, 59 S.E.2d 43 (1950).
82. GA. CODE § 26-6502 (1933).
83. Yopp v. State, 79 Ga. App. 584, 54 S.E.2d 505 (1949).

1950]

CRIMINAL LAW

posed to the commission of mischief." Balard v. State," an illegal fishing
case, discusses at length the subject of intention. The court expounds the
proposition that criminal intention merely means the conscious perpetration of an act, which act is contrary to law. It does not necessarily mean the
doing of an act known to be wrong.
The rule laid down in Oglesby v.State" may be of some real consequence
in controlling the retail selling of whisky. In a prosecution for possessing
more whisk), than the law permits, the defendant claimed that the numerous bottles of whisky found in his place of business belonged, not to himself, but to a group of friends, and that he was simply holding it for them.
The court held that title to such whisky was not in issue, lack of ownership being no defense to a prosecution for possessing an illegal amount of
whisky.
The Court of Appeals decided, in Houston v. State," that presence at
and flight from a whisky still are sufficient facts to warrant a conviction
when such facts are not satisfactorily explained. An indictment, under
which a defendant was convicted and which did not set out that he had
illegal apparatus for manufacturing whisky on his premises, was faulty
and did not charge a crime-an allegation of mere possession of such
88 holds that
equipment is not an allegation of crime.8" State v. Patterson
instrumentalities
the State of Georgia does not have the right to condemn
used in handling illegal beer as it does regarding illegal whisky. Prior to
1935, the state did have such a right, but, with the passage of the Act of
1935,8" beer was removed from the category of prohibited liquors, and
vehicles and other equipment used to handle it illegally cannot be condemned.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

In Montgomery '. State"0 the defendant, through the use of certain
tools, attempted illegally to enter a building. He underwent a sudden
change of heart, and abandoned the crime. Subsequently, he was app.rehended while still in possession of the tools and indicted for possessing
burglary tools with an intent to use the same. The court was of the
opinion that the crime charged had been committed before the abandonment of the actual burglary.
When a defendant is caught attempting to enter a building, it is of
course true that an intention to steal will be inferred. 9 Moreover, the
recent possession of stolen goods raises a presumption of guilt.9" This socalled presumption, however, is not a presumption of law but an inference
of fact, which merely places on a defendant the procedural burden of moving forward in explanation of such possession."
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It has been held that when a defendant accepts a certain sum of money
for the purpose of procuring a car" or a tombstone' for another, but fails
either to procure the goods or return the money, he is not guilty of larceny
after trust. The reason is that no money was intrusted to the defendant.
In larceny cases generally, it is permissible to show prior thieving transactions where it is essential to show specific intent in a case on trial. For
instance, in Harden v. State,' the State was permitted to prove that the
defendant had previously enticed away a pig with intent to steal.
An interesting situation arose in Douglas v. State."' The defendant gave
a note for $300 to a person who had bailed him out of jail. He later
wrote a worthless check to pay off the note, but did not get back his note.
He was indicted for uttering the check with intent to defraud. In reversing
the conviction, the court said "... the charge fails when it appears that no
loss resulted from the act alleged to have been fraudulent. No loss, no
fraud. This is true in law, at least, and we think it is also true in morals."
In another forgery case, Curtis v. State,' the solicitor general set out the
wrong numerical designations of Code sections in the indictment. It was
decided by the court that this mistake did not materially affect the instrument. The thing that governs is whether or not the allegation set out a
crime.
In Chandler v. State" the Court of Appeals elucidated at length on the
crime of deceitful practices and artful means. It held that the elements
,essential to the commission of this crime are: representations, knowingly
and designedly false; an intent to defraud; that the representations related
to an existing fact or past event; and that someone relied thereon and
suffered injury thereby. This crime was committed when a man sold his
car under the representation that it had no liens against it, when in fact it
had several.' 0
STATUTES

During the 195o session of the General Assembly, several acts were
passed relating to criminal law and procedure.
Code Section 27-2702, ' dealing with the power of court to place
offenders on probation, was amended by Act 7 62.L" The court is now permitted, when satisfied that "the circumstances of the case and the public
good does [sic] not demand . ..the defendant's incarceration," to place
convicted offenders on probation. Formerly, this power was limited to
misdemeanors and felonies reduced to misdemeandors. The 195o amendment, however, extends the courts' power to all offenses against, the State.
Section 27-2502, relating to indeterminate sentences for felonies not
punishable by life imprisonment, was amended"3 by being stricken in its
94. Tant v. State, 81 Ga. App. 633, 59 S.E.2d 557 (1950).
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entirety and a new section substituted therefor. The substantial change
accomplished, however, was in striking the last sentence of the old section
(which provided that the Prison Commission should fix rules under which
a convict, after serving his minimum sentence, might be allowed to complete his sentence without the confines of the penitentiary) and substituting
the following language: "However, the judge imposing the said sentence
is hereby granted power and authority to suspend or probate said sentence,
under such rules and regulations as he thinks proper. Said judge is also empowered with the right and authority to revoke such suspension or probation when the defendant has violated any of the rules and regulations prescribed by the court."
It appears that the general purpose of Act 762 is to take all power over
probation and suspension of sentence from the Prison Commission and to
transfer it to the sentencing judge, and to further provide that the judge's
authority terminates upon the convict's commital to the penitentiary, no
further probation or suspension of sentence being possible after that time.
Code Section 24-3005, which provides for the payment from the county
treasury of contingent expenses of superior courts, was amended by Act
840."'4 This amendment adds, as a contingent expense, pre-sentence psychiatric examinations of persons convicted of criminal offenses in counties of
more than 70,000 people when, in the discretion of the judge, "such examination is necessary to a just and proper sentence."
The legislature also incorporated into Georgia law the Uniform Act
for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision." 5 This act authorizes the governor
to execute a compact, on behalf of Georgia, with any of the United States,
permitting parolees and probationers to reside in the signatory states (i)
if they have families there, (2) can obtain employment there or (3) can
get permission to live there from the signatory state. When the parolee
or probationer goes into the "receiving state," it assumes the duties of
visitation and supervision and applies the same standards governing such
duties that prevail in respect to its own parolees and probationers. The
"sending state" may send its accredited officers into a "receiving state"
and there retake any parolee or probationer, "all legal requirements to
obtain extradition of fugitives from justice ...[being] expressly waived
on the part of States party hereto, as to such persons."
The last act to be considered deals with the substantive law. A new
crime-the molestation of children-has been added to Chapter 26 of the
Code." 6 The statute reads: "Any person who shall take, or attempt to take
any immoral, improper, of [sic] indecent liberties with any child of either
sex, under the age of sixteen years, with intent of arousing, appealing to,
or gratifying the lust or passions of sexual desires . . . shall be imprisoned
in a penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years." Luring a
child away for one of these purposes is also punishable by from one to five
years. The enactment further provides that "consent by a child to any act
prescribed ...shall not be a defense, nor shall lack of knowledge of the
child's age be a defense."
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